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A. Introduction 
Neil Walker published a paper in 2004 in which he analysed the 
Convention on the Future of Europe in terms of the concept of a 
constitutional moment made salient by Bruce Ackerman during the late 
1980s and 1990s.1 The first lines of the paper refer to the rhetorical 
discourse of the Convention as “replete with references to the United 
States’ founding constitutional event over 200 years earlier” and the 
documenting footnote mentions the leading role that Valery Giscard 
D’Estaing, chairman of the Convention, played in the rise of this 
rhetoric.2 One finds thus, in these opening lines of Walker’s 2004 
article, an evident and compelling linkage between two temporal 
notions, the notion of a constitutional event, on the one hand, and the 
____________________ 
1 Neil Walker, “The Legacy of Europe’s Constitutional Moment,” 
Constellations 11, no. 3 (2004): 368–92. See also Bruce Ackermann, 
“Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,” Yale Law Journal 99, no. 3 
(1989): 453–547; Bruce Ackermann, We the People: Foundations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Bruce Ackermann, We 
the People: Transformations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998). 
2 See Walker, “The Legacy of Europe’s Constitutional Moment,” 388, fn. 2. 
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notion of a constitutional moment, on the other. What is at stake in the 
invocation of a constitutional moment as a constitutional event? 
One of the key features of a constitutional moment concerns the way 
it launches a discourse that exceeds the discursive framework of an 
existing constitutional and legal order. It signals a distinctly temporal 
inception of a new constitutional and legal framework during the time of 
which the following situation prevails: 
- 1) The settled constitutionality and legality of an old 
constitutional and legal order is rendered obsolete. 
- 2) The new order that is in the process of being introduced 
cannot, as yet, claim the established legality and 
constitutionality that the now obsolete order used to command. 
- 3) For purposes of articulating and establishing the new 
constitutional order, linguistic and epistemological materials that 
described and determined the obsolete order inevitably remain, 
at least partially, in use. 
At issue under 3) are not necessarily, and surely not only, the 
amendment rules of the old order that Andrew Arato invokes to stress 
the constitutional and legal continuity between old and new 
constitutional orders.3 More fundamentally at issue is the fundamental 
____________________ 
3 For references to and a discussion of Arato’s insistence on legal 
continuity against the background of the constitutional transition in South 
Africa, see Johan van der Walt, “Constitution-Making as a Learning 
Process: Andrew Arato’s Model of Post-Sovereign Constitution Making – 
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hermeneutic exigency that compels any articulation of new knowledge 
and new discourses to rely substantially on existing or old knowledge 
and discourses.4 A certain degree of hermeneutic, semantic, and 
normative continuity thus appears inevitable as far as constitutional 
moments or events, and the eventual stabilisation of new constitutional 
orders, are concerned.5 Yet, any adamant concern with the event or 
moment as that which constitutes a severing temporal incision that 
renders existing hermeneutics definitely obsolete and new 
hermeneutics significantly novel (Walker emphasizes the terms 
“discontinuity and transformation”6), would require concession of at 
                                                                                                                     
Editor’s Introduction,” South African Journal on Human Rights 26, no. 1 
(2010): 15. 
4 One of the pioneering and most authoritative analyses of which is still 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s engagement with the indispensible pre-
understanding (Vor-verständnis), embodied in pre-judgements (Vorurteile) 
in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit Und Methode (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 
Paul Siebeck, 1972), 250–290. 
5 Hannah Arendt also engaged extensively with this insight in Hannah 
Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Pengiun Books, 1990), 205, 210–211, 
emphasizing on the indispensible chiasm or hiatus between pre- and post-
revolutionary orders, but also an assumed continuity in terms of which the 
new constitution and foundation could be interpreted as a restoration of 
trans-temporal normative principles. For a discussion of the complexity of 
Arendt’s views in this regard, See Johan van der Walt, “Law and the 
Space of Appearance in Arendt’s Thought,” in Marco Goldoni and 
Christopher McCorkindale (eds), Hannah Arendt and the Law (Oxford; 
Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2013), 63–88. 
6 Walker, “The Legacy of Europe’s Constitutional Moment,” 368. The 
transformation is, one might add in view of the hermeneutic exigency 
pointed out above, always partial. But, the significance or incisiveness of 
the transformation will depend on the extent to which the transformation 
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least two elements that qualify the classic hermeneutic demands for 
pre-understanding or prior knowledge incisively: 
- 3.1) If the event indeed renders existing or old hermeneutics 
obsolete, the continued reliance on such hermeneutics can, at 
best, be said to accompany the event and the traversal of the 
event. It does not address, reflect, or name the event in any 
significant way. 
- 3.2) Whatever newness can be attributed to the emergence 
and eventual stabilisation of a new constitutional order does 
not, and cannot, pertain to the hermeneutics borrowed from 
the old order; it can only pertain to the event itself, which such 
hermeneutics exactly does not and cannot address, reflect, or 
name, but only accompany. 
The significant newness of a new constitutional order can thus, to a 
significant extent, only be invoked with reference to an event or 
moment (or something) that can definitely neither be named within that 
order, nor be named with reference to anything that can be named in 
that order. These observations also clarify what was really at stake in 
the classic stand off between Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen regarding 
the origin of constitutions. Schmitt was the typical hermeneutic thinker 
who insisted on the continuing and uninterrupted capacity of the 
                                                                                                                     
can, despite its necessary reliance on old semantics, indeed be said to 
turn on a discontinuity that it cannot name fully, also not from within a new 
semantics. 
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pouvoir constituant to name and rename itself.7 Kelsen was the typical 
constructivist (surreptitiously deconstructivist) thinker who insisted that 
new constitutional beginnings cannot be named. They can only be 
assumed or presupposed in view of events that cannot be named 
within the legal order.8 We return to Schmitt and Kelsen below. Suffice 
it to leave matters here, for now, to return to the introductory question 
regarding the nature of the event and the constitutional event, in 
particular.  
____________________ 
7 See Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 
79–80: “Auf der verfassunggebenden Gewalt beruhen alle 
verfassungsmässig konstitutiertien Befugnisse und Zuständigkeiten. Sie 
selbst aber kann sich niemals verfassungsgesetzlich konstituieren. Das 
Volk, die Nation, bleibt der Urgrund alles politischen Geschehens, die 
Quelle aller Kraft, die sich in immer neuen Formen äussert, immer neue 
Formen und Organisationen aus sich herausstellt, selber jedoch niemals 
ihre politische Existenz einer endgültigen Formierung unterordnet....In 
manche Äusserungen von Sieyès erscheint der ‘pouvoir constituant’ in 
seinem Verhältnis zu allen ‘pouvoirs constitués’ in einer metaphysischen 
Analogie zu der ‘natura naturans’ und ihrem Verhältnis zur ‘natura 
naturata’ nach der Lehre Spinozas: ein unerschöpflicher Urgrund aller 
Formen, selber in keiner Form zu Fassen, ewig neue Formen aus sich 
herausstellend, formlos alle Formen bildend.” However formless, the 
people (Volk) remains the nameable underlying substance that guarantees 
constitutional and hermeneutic continuity. 
8 According to Kelsen, the Grundnorm never exists as positive or posited 
(gesetzte) presence. Its existence is always presupposed (vorausgesetzt). 
See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1994), 66–
67. In keeping with this, a demos or people also does not exist as a 
positive or posited presence. Its existence is attributed to it by a 
presupposed Grundnorm. See Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der 
Demokratie (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1981), 31–32. 
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What is the event? This question constituted one of the major 
concerns in 20th century European philosophy.9 A key suggestion 
regarding the nature or status of the event that can be distilled from a 
number of significant texts is this: The event concerns an emergence 
or disclosure of an unprecedented reconfiguration of the relation 
between platitudinous knowledge and abyssal ignorance in the course 
of which a new epistemology or a new era or epoch of knowledge and 
understanding begins to assert and establish itself. The event typically 
concerns a temporal or epochal emergence of a critical demand for 
new knowledge and new understanding that is accompanied by 
reliance on available knowledge and understanding that no longer 
meets the demand for knowledge that the event exacts. As already 
suggested above, the event is merely accompanied by reliance on 
knowledge that does not respond to it. The event is thus accompanied 
by knowledge that does not meet the demand for knowledge, hence 
the definition of the event in terms of an emergence of a new 
configuration of knowledge and ignorance. A constitutional event or the 
event of founding a new legal dispensation or system is similarly the 
manifestation of an event in which a new configuration of the relation 
between law and legal knowledge, on the one hand, and non-law and 
____________________ 
9 Consider in this regard Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens 
(Tuሷbingen: Max Miemeyer Verlag, 1976); Jean-Luc Nancy, Une Pensée 
Finie (Paris: Galilée, 1990); Jean-Luc Nancy, Le Sens du Monde (Paris: 
Galilée, 1993); Jean-Luc Nancy, Être Singulier Pluriel (Paris: Galilée, 
1996); Jacques Derrida, Donner le Temps 1. La Fausse Monnaie (Paris: 
Galilée, 1991); Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx (Paris: Galilée, 1993); 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press, 1989); Arendt, On Revolution, supra. The description of the event 
that follows is informed and influenced by all these texts, but not 
necessarily exegetically faithful to any one of them. 
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lack of legal knowledge, on the other, emerges. In the course/wake of 
this emergence a new framework of law and legal knowledge begins to 
assert and establish itself, thus again severing law’s interim 
engagement with an abyssal lack of law and a precipitous absence of 
legal knowledge. 
To the extent that some significant response to the event is possible, 
that response would not consist in a direct reflection of the event (such 
a reflection would be categorically impossible for lack of hermeneutic 
resources). It would consist in a practice that responds to the 
incongruence between knowledge and the event and thus facilitates 
the reconfiguration of knowledge and ignorance that emerges with/in 
the wake of the event. That practice would clearly exceed the bounds 
of knowledge and understanding. It would consist in a doing that would 
not understand fully what is being done. At issue here, in other words, 
is a practice that constitutes, epistemologically speaking, an excessive 
response to the event. The core hypothesis of this paper concerns the 
status of this exceeding practice. This core hypothesis can be stated 
as follows: The response to the event that exceeds knowledge (again, 
as it must if it is to be a response to the event and not just a non-
responsive hermeneutic accompaniment that blindly traverses the time 
and space and epoche of the event) takes the form of either gift or 
sacrifice or a mixture of gift and sacrifice. The core question that this 
paper will pursue on the basis of its core hypothesis concerns the 
possibility of a distinction between gift and sacrifice and the possibility 
of a response to constitutional events that pivots on the gift and not on 
sacrifice, or at least pivots significantly on the gift and not completely 
on sacrifice. And, this core question will be asked in the context of 
Europe’s twofold inability that emerged during the years of the recent, if 
not still current, economic crisis: the inability to respond creatively and 
productively to the current financial crisis and the inability to move 
toward more significant constitutional unity.  
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Talk is now that the crisis is over and that we have been saved from 
it, in the end, by Angela Merkel and/or Mario Dragghi.10 The solution 
with which Dragghi came up and with which Merkel went along in the 
end, nothwithstanding the discontent of her own (German) bankers, 
can hardly be said to have been a creative response to the event and it 
surely did not move Europe significantly closer to incisive constitutional 
unity. At issue in Dragghi’s solution, with which Merkel went along, was 
a technocratic move that did not alter the political face or climate of 
Europe in the least. What Dragghi’s move managed to do was to 
drastically discourage sovereign debt speculation. This was surely not 
insignificant and the determined and decisive way in which he did so 
surely calls for much respect. It should nevertheless be considered 
ironic that Europe’s chief banker and not Europe’s most powerful 
politician will be remembered as the one who acted like a statesman 
when the occasion called for it. And this irony surely stresses the 
reality that Europe’s politics and politicians still lack the essential 
resource they require for facing the challenges of the twenty-first 
century, namely, the ability to resort to knowledge-exceeding practices 
that used to be associated with political sovereignty. It is with these 
practices that the rest of this essay will be concerned. And the concern 
is crucial, for the first two decades of the twenty-first century have 
evidently come to confront Europeans with exigencies to which they 
cannot hope to respond with knowledge that is as relevant as it is 
secure or as secure as it is relevant. In the event of the event, in the 
very event of its offing, the relation between security and relevance of 
knowledge is not parallel, but inversely parallel. 
  
____________________ 
10 See Pieter Spiegel, “How the Euro was Saved,” Financial Times, 11 May 
2014. 
[Type text] [Type text] Johan van der Walt 
B. Timeo Danais Dona Ferre 
Vergil’s line was of course a different one: Timeo Danaos, et dona 
ferentes. I fear the Greeks, also (or especially) when they bring gifts. 
What happens to the line when one turns the accusative Danaos into 
the dative Danais, and the present participle construction dona 
ferentes into an infinitive construction dona ferre, as has been ventured 
in the title above? For all its clumsiness, it may well pass as a 
reasonably apt construction of this sentence: I fear bringing gifts to the 
Greeks. 
Does the fear of bringing gifts to the Greeks tell one anything 
significant about the question whether Europeans may one day have 
come to give themselves a constitution? May the fear of bringing gifts 
to the Greeks be the same fear that has hitherto prevented Europeans 
from having given themselves a constitution? I wish to explore this 
question with specific reference to the symbolics of giving that have 
conspicuously adorned the birth of significant European constitutions in 
the Salle du jeu de paume, Versailles 1789; in the Paulskirche, 
Frankfurt 1848; and in the Theatergebäude, Weimar 1919. 
The verb donner, to give, does not appear in either the Serment du 
Jeu de Paume of 1789 or the Declaration de l’homme et du citoyen of 
1791. However, a memorial plaque fixed above the door at the time of 
the restoration of the Salle du Jeu de Paume in 1883 reads as follows: 
“Dans ce jeu du paume, le xx juin, MDCCLXXXIX, les députés du 
peuple … jurerent de ne point se séparer qu’ils ne eussent donné une 
constitution à la France. Ils ont tenu parole.” (Emphasis added) 
The first line of the Paulskirche Constitution of 1849 already appears 
to mark some shift to the notion of constitution-giving. It invokes a 
constitution-giving national assembly – eine Verfassunggebende 
Nationalversammlung. The first lines of the Weimar Constitution of 
1919 invoke the notion of constitution-giving more forcefully: “Das 
deutsche Volk … von dem Willen beseelt sein Reich in Freiheit und 
Gerechtigkeit zu dienen und den gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt zu 
fördern, hat sich diese Verfassung gegeben.” There is also a memorial 
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plaque on the Theatergebäude in Weimar that reads: In diesem Haus 
gab sich das Deutsche Volk durch seine Nationalversammlung die 
Weimarer Verfassung von 11 August 1919. 
The first Luxembourg Constitution of 1841 was surely given 
(accorded) to Luxembourgers in no uncertain terms. The first lines of 
the preamble read: “Nous Guillaume II, par la grace de Dieu, Roi de 
Pays-Bas, Prince D’Orange-Nassau, Grand Duc de Luxembourg … 
avons resolu de accorder à nos sujets du Luxembourg une 
Constitution…” This vertical line from the grace of God to the King to 
the subjects of the King will surely be put in question by the concept of 
non-sacrificial giving that will be at issue in this essay, but it can be 
commended for at least solving the juridical puzzle evident in the 
notion of a people giving itself a constitution.11 Juridically speaking, one 
____________________ 
11 I single out the Luxembourg Constitution of 1841 here, because this 
Constitution is a remarkably late example of constitutions that invoke a 
vertical connection, through a sovereign, between a people and God. From 
1791 onwards, but especially after 1815, European Constitutions would no 
longer invoke this vertical link but simply invoke in their preambles a 
popular sovereignty that ordains or decrees a constitution for itself. In 
1849, the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV would still or again resist this 
horizontalisation of constitutional sovereignty by rejecting the invitation of 
the Paulskirche Assembly to become the King of a United Germany. He 
insisted that he obtains his sovereignty from the higher authority of the 
heavens. See Deutscher Bundestag, (ed.), Fragen an die deutsche 
Geschichte (Bonn: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1990), 147–148. It is this 
vertical or political theological resistance – and one might read here into 
the word ‘resistance’ all the psychoanalytical connotations of the word – 
that was overcome, if only briefly, in the Weimar Constitution of 1919. The 
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cannot give oneself a gift. The deputies of France cannot give France a 
constitution without assuming a position outside France. They cannot 
give France a constitution without bringing about a certain doubling of 
France that would allow for the transfer, or changing of hands, without 
which no giving of gifts can be imagined. No wonder that political 
theology or the theological foundation of politics would return so 
forthwith to France in the wake of the revolution, as Claude Lefort 
pointed out in his classic essay Permanence du theologico-politique?12 
An essential metaphysical doubling is exactly what political theology 
affords a polity. 
The next section of this essay will highlight the extent to which 
sacrifice, as one possible source of constitutions, turns on or facilitates 
this political theological metaphysical doubling. Suffice it to note here, 
however, that the gift, should it come to be given, would also require a 
doubling of sorts. And the question that presses here is this: Can the 
prerequisite doubling that might come to facilitate the gift, giving and 
indeed constitution-giving as an instance of the giving of gifts, be 
contemplated without a metaphysical doubling of the people, that is, 
without invoking a sacred second order that is the real origin of the 
people and the actual donor or donateur of its constitution? 
The status of the Nationalversammlung that gave Germany the 
Weimar Constitution in 1919 casts significant light on the question 
regarding a non-metaphysical doubling of the people. The Weimar 
Constitution indeed appears to confront one with a challenge to the 
political theological foundation of constitution-giving. In the case of 
Weimar, the claim is expressly that the German people gave 
themselves – gab sich – a constitution. Should one assume for now 
                                                                                                                     
United States Constitution would already break with this vertical 
constitution of nationhood in 1789. 
12 Claude Lefort, Essais Sur Le Politique – XIXe-XXe Siècles (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1986), 275–329. 
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that the symbolism of the Weimar Constitution indeed constitutes an 
instance of resistance to political theology and the political theological 
conception of constitution-giving, one would have to clarify the status 
and possibility of the non-metaphysical doubling that would allow for a 
notion of constitution-giving that does not rely on a transcendent donor 
or donateur as the Luxembourg Constitution of 1841 does. One of the 
key aims of this article is indeed to scrutinise whether such a non-
metaphysical doubling of the people is possible or at least conceivable. 
This key concern can now be stated comprehensively as follows: A 
doubling of the people seems to be a precondition for contemplating 
the change of hands, delivery, or transfer – the traditio – evident in the 
notion of constitution-making as an instance of giving. Must this 
doubling necessarily be a vertical doubling (as the Luxembourg 
Constitution of 1841 suggests) or is there a possibility of a horizontal 
doubling (as the Weimar Constitution of 1919 suggests)? 
Again, the nature and possibility of this non-metaphysical doubling 
still requires clarification. However, the following may already be noted 
now: Should this horizontal or non-metaphysical doubling currently not 
appear possible in contemporary Europe, as would indeed seem to be 
the case, this impossibility can plausibly be assumed to relate to a fear 
of bringing gifts. Europe’s procrastinating inability to deal decisively 
and politically with the failure of the Greek and other southern 
European economies in recent years (again, the only worthy act of 
statemenship would come from a banker – see above) appears to 
underline the plausibility of this assumption. Europe’s constitutional 
development would appear to be arrested by a fear of bringing gifts to 
the Greeks – timere Danai dona ferre. Should this fear continue to hold 
sway, Europe’s constitutional event will, at best, turn into a non-event 
in the course of which no reconfiguration of its existing constitutional or 
legal knowledge-ignorance constellations will be risked. A mindless 
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incrementalism – ein Kopfloser Inkrementalismus, Jürgen Habermas 
calls it13 – will prevail over what could have been Europe’s 
constitutional event. 
We return to reflect more on this phrase of Habermas below. But, it 
can already be noted here that the phrase surely marks a concern with 
the opposite of, or at least something significantly different from, this 
mindless incrementalism. It surely marks Habermas’ contemplation of 
a mindful decisiveness, a decisiveness that does not follow from a 
series of pusillanimous positions, but risks a more creative and 
courageous solicitation of and engagement with the unknown. At least 
here, at least with respect to this phrase, Derrida, the thinker who was 
renowned for contemplating a courageous hospitality to the event,14 
appears to have left Habermas – the thinker who for such a long time 
wanted to secure transcendental linguistic conditions that would render 
all learning processes essentially uneventful and incremental15 – with 
more than a mere sense of friendship (assuming for a moment there is 
something like a mere sense of friendship, as if a sense of friendship is 
not always, at least partly, an excessive/exceeding engagement with 
the unknown).16 
Be that as it may, the observation that Europe’s mindless 
incrementalism may at best turn out to be a non-event requires further 
____________________ 
13 Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2011), 41. 
14 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 111–112 . 
15 I am referring to the phase or aspect of his thought marked 
predominantly by Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, (Frankfurt a. M: 
Suhrkamp, 1981). 
16 Jürgen Habermas, Ach Europa, (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 2008), 63–
64. 
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reflection, for there may well be more to it than a non-event. Europe’s 
“uneventful” incrementalism may well be the façade of obsolete 
knowledge that accompanies and even seeks to obscure an event that 
is evidently in the offing. And not only does this façade of obsolete 
knowledge blindly accompany and obscure this event in the offing, it 
also conditions this event significantly. The continued reliance on 
obsolete knowledge not only accompanies but also precipitates the 
event (in the way the persistent adherence to obsolete conceptions of 
justice may precipitate ineffable revolutionary demands for justice or 
the way the very monotony of dulled rhythms can spawn transgressive 
choreographic improvisations). The event at issue here, accompanied 
as it is by insistent adherence to the existent and the obsolete, is 
nevertheless not the event of the gift, for it gives nothing. It does not 
offer significant newness or innovation, however much such newness 
and innovation may come to overtake it. It is the event of sacrifice, 
namely, the un-giving and unforgiving sacrificial maintenance of an 
obsolete past that, despite its best efforts to resist the event, may 
nevertheless be overtaken by the event. The event of the gift, on the 
other hand, may ultimately not be entirely devoid of sacrifice. However, 
in order to be something else, something significantly different from 
sacrifice, it would have to contain elements of a gift economy that 
exceed the economics of sacrifice. But, we are rushing on ahead of 
ourselves. For these observations to become fully comprehensible, 
one first needs to scrutinise more closely the difference between the 
event of sacrifice and the event of the gift and the possibility of this 
very distinction. 
 
C. Between Gift and Sacrifice 
There is indeed a conspicuous switch of emphasis from the verbs 
deciding, announcing, establishing and declaring in the Serment du 
Jeu du Paume of 1789 or the Declaration de l’homme et du citoyen of 
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1791, and the Paulskirche Constitution of 1849, on the one hand, to 
the verb giving in the Weimar Constitution and on the memorial 
plaques fixed to the Salle du Jeu du Paume in Versailles, 1883, and 
later also to the Theatergebäude in Weimar. Might one infer from this 
switch an emergence in Europe of a stronger regard for constitution-
making as a matter of constitution-giving toward the end of the 
nineteenth century? The historical research required for answering this 
question, either positively or negatively, cannot be offered in what 
follows. Let us nevertheless assume or presuppose for the moment 
that this question might be answered positively. What would this 
assumption or presupposition suggest as far as the semantics of 
European constitutional discourses are concerned? It would suggest, I 
wish to argue, that Constitutions may, at least partly, be considered as 
gifts. It would further suggest that giving, indeed the giving of gifts, 
might be an alternative origin of Constitutions. Alternative? What might 
the other origin then be? A remarkable passage from one of Ulrich 
Preuss’ instructive engagements with constitutional beginnings 
provides one with an important clue. Preuss writes: 
Constitutions come into being after a revolution or war . . . After a 
revolution . . .  the triumphant forces lay out their principles of how 
society should be ordered. [They impose] their rule upon the defeated 
groups who are then usually denounced as ‘counter-revolutionary,’ 
‘reactionary,’ or sometimes even as enemies of the people.  
Constitution-making after a war is not very different. If the war was lost, 
then the demoralized masses place the blame for their defeat and 
sufferings on the . . .  ‘old regime.’ They throw their rulers out of office 
and . . .  demand . . .  a new constitution [that] reflect their needs, 
hopes and aspirations. But even after a victorious war, a new 
distribution of power, i.e. a new constitution, is on the agenda of the 
nation. The people want recognition and remuneration for their 
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sacrifices and hence demand a new distribution of the benefits of the 
social compact.17 
Preuss’ use of the word “sacrifice” in this passage may or may not 
have been guided by the aim of invoking deep anthropological or 
hermeneutic dynamics of political creation and destruction. The use of 
the word sacrifice in this passage may only seek to invoke the 
common-sense demand that those who caused or failed to avoid 
suffering in the past must pay up and those who suffered in the past 
must be compensated. In other words, new sacrifices are demanded to 
compensate for old sacrifices, and so forth. As the passage stands, 
however, its reliance on the word “sacrifice” in a description of new 
political and constitutional beginnings can hardly fail to direct our 
attention to philosophical and anthropological engagements with the 
deeper dynamics of sacrificial practices in legal and political 
beginnings. 
The Strasbourg philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy links Western 
conceptions of political sovereignty and political theology directly to the 
generic metaphysics of sacrifice that informs Western thought. Nancy 
writes: 
On this count, the political must be destined to have history as its 
scope, sovereignty for its emblem and sacrifice for its access. We 
should retrace the impressive history of political sacrifice and sacrificial 
politics, or, actually, of the politics of truth, that is to say, of the 
theologico-political: We must trace it from the sacrifice that is expressly 
____________________ 
17 Ulrich K. Preuss, “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism,” New 
York Law School Law Review 51 (2006/7): 469–470, emphasis added, text 
slightly paraphrased. 
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religious right to the diverse acts of terror, and to all national, militant 
and partisan sacrifices. To all politics for which cause sacrifice is due. 
In this regard, all political theology, right up to its secularisation, can 
only be sacrificial.18 
We cannot engage extensively here with Nancy’s profound 
reflections on the deep links between sovereignty and the generic 
metaphysics of sacrifice. Suffice it to observe briefly the key thought 
that he articulates in this regard. The Western metaphysical mind-set 
refuses to accept that existence is just existence. Western meta-
physics turns on the political theological insistence that there is physics 
beyond physics. Meta-physics pivots on a doubling of existence, a 
doubling of existence that links the empirical to a transcendent reality 
beyond itself. Metaphysics thus also ties the horizontality of the 
empirical plane of existence into a vertical relation with its transcendent 
double. And the essential knot that effects this tie, according to Nancy, 
is sacrifice. Sacrifice is the essential cognitive/non cognitive act, 
embodied in a myriad of ritual practices, that splits existence into the 
empirical and meta-empirical, the earthly and heavenly, the mortal and 
immortal, and the mundane and the sacred. 
Nancy’s thoughts in this regard are corroborated by findings of 
cultural anthropologists. As Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss put it, 
sacrifice was the pivotal act through which the archaic mind first 
____________________ 
18 Translated from Nancy, Le Sens du Monde, 141: “A ce compte, la 
politique doit être destin, avoir l’histoire pour carrière, la souveraineté pour 
emblème et le sacrifice pour accès. Il faudrait retracer l’histoire 
impressionnante du sacrifice politique, de la politique sacrificielle – ou de 
la politique en vérité, c’est-à-dire du ‘théologico-politique’ [ou] la Politique 
de la Cause à laquelle le sacrifice est dû. En cela, tout le théologico-
politique, jusque dans sa ‘sécularisation,’ . . .  ne peut être que sacrificiel.” 
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created the different worlds of mortal humans and immortal gods.19 
Nancy’s analyses of the fundamental metaphysical doubling performed 
or enacted by sacrifice are guided by the endeavour to undo this 
doubling. Nancy seeks to communicate the message that existence is 
just existence. Existence cannot be sacrificed, it can only be destroyed 
or shared, he writes.20 Subliminal endeavours to create a second order 
of existence through sacrificial incinerations do not produce anything. 
They do not produce the second order that they claim to produce. They 
just destroy. They produce nothing but ash. Its claim to effect a vertical 
link between the horizontal plane and its heavenly double is the myth 
of a communal existence that seeks to operationalize itself.21 It is the 
myth – the mobilising truth – staged by an operative community. Nancy 
contemplates, in response to this operative myth, the possibility of an 
inoperative and therefore non-sacrificial community, a community to 
which he refers as a horizontality of mortals – une horizontalité de 
morts.22 This horizontal community would not be united through a 
vertical line that ties it to its transcendental double. 
____________________ 
19 Henri Hubert & Marcel Mauss, Essai sur la Nature et la Fonction du 
Sacrifice in Marcel Mauss, Oeuvres 1. Les Fonctions Sociales du Sacré, 
(Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1968), 297–299 . 
20 Nancy, Une Pensée Finie, 105: “L’existence n’est pas à sacrifier, et on 
ne peut la sacrifier. One peut que la détruire, ou la partager.” 
21 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Communauté Désœuvrée, (Paris: Christian 
Bourgois, 1999), 109–173. 
22 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, (Paris: Éditions Métaillé, 2000), 49; Jacques 
Derrida, Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy, (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2000), 
253–254 . 
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Nancy is undoubtedly one of the truly percipient thinkers of our time. 
Another is the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. In one of 
Agamben’s essays, we find the following observation: All human facere 
is sacer facere.23 All human doing or all human making is sacrifice. We 
know that facere can be translated with both making and doing. Might 
some human activity be exempted from Agamben’s comprehensive 
description of human conduct as a matter of sacrifice? If not, there 
would surely be little hope for Nancy’s contemplation of a non-
sacrificial existence. If not, there would be little point in exploring the 
possibility of constitution-giving as a kind of constitution-making that is 
not or not exhaustively a matter of sacer facere or sacrifice. One would 
have to accept that Ulrich Preuss’ passage quoted above gives us the 
definitive and exhaustive assessment of the dynamics of constitution-
making. However, if no human activity can be exempted from 
Agamben’s comprehensive description of human conduct as a matter 
of sacrifice, one would also have to note in passing that Agamben 
himself would surely have considerable difficulty explaining the 
significance of his extensive engagement with homo sacer, the 
enigmatic figure in Roman criminal law that Pompeius Festus 
described as the one who may be killed but not sacrificed.24 
Is there the slightest possibility that giving, dare, might at least partly 
be exempted from facere as sacer facere, so that one might 
meaningfully explore the possibility of a constitution-giving that is not a 
matter of sacrifice? Might one find, in the margins of sacrifice, a 
precarious possibility that new political beginnings may emerge from a 
gift that is not entirely permeated by sacrifice? Alexander, the main 
protagonist in Andrei Tarkowski’s sublime film The Sacrifice observes: 
“Every sacrifice contains a gift, and every gift a sacrifice.” Yet, this very 
____________________ 
23 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 135. 
24 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 71–80 . 
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observation suggests that there is some significant distinction and 
differentiation between sacrifice and the gift that demands attention. 
Alexander – or Tarkovksi – does not simply suggest that the gift is 
nothing but a sacrifice, and vice versa. His suggestion is only that there 
is something of the one in the other. Is there a faint possibility that the 
sacrifice-gift compound may sometimes curdle, like milk curdles, so as 
to render visible two distinctly different elements, gift and sacrifice, in 
what may otherwise have passed as a simple substance characterised 
by the latter, that is, by sacrifice only? A careful reading of Marcel 
Mauss’ famous Essai sur le don gives pause for considerable thought 
in this regard. It may well be high time for European legal, political, and 
social theorists to return to this text that Claude Levi-Strauss read in 
1951 with a beating heart and an effervescent head – “le cœur battant, 
la tête bouillonante.”25 
It is not possible to do justice, in what follows, to this text that 
inspired several of the legendary thinkers that launched the great wave 
of French philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century. 
Suffice it to trace one of its central themes with reference to a number 
of key passages, the first of which concerns Mauss’ conviction that the 
morality and economy of the gift that his essay sets out to analyse, still 
constitute one of the pillars of contemporary society – “un des rocs 
humains sur lesquels sont bâties nos societés . . .”26 
____________________ 
25 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Introduction à l’œuvre de Marcel Mauss” in Marcel 
Mauss, Sociologie et Anthropologie, (Paris: PUF, 1950). See also Florence 
Weber’s introduction to Marcel Mauss, Essai sur le Don, (Paris: 
PUF/Quadrige, 2007), 8. 
26 Mauss, Essai sur le Don, 67–68 . 
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One of the rocks of humanity on which human societies are built? 
What might the other or others be? Mauss never comes back to this 
point expressly, but another passage early in the essay may well be a 
key to this question. The ritual contractual exchanges of gifts between 
humans, on the one hand, and humans and gods, on the other, claims 
Mauss, clarifies one complete side of the theory of sacrifice – “tout un 
coté de la théorie du Sacrifice.”27 What might the other side of the 
theory of sacrifice be? And, how might these two sides of sacrifice 
relate to the other rock or rocks of humanity on which our societies are 
built? Mauss is again far from systematically clear as far as this 
question is concerned, but one point seems abundantly clear thus far: 
The theory of the gift or the analysis of the gift is part of a broader 
theory of sacrifice. This much is corroborated by the distinction 
between the blood sacrifice and the sacrifice-gift, the sacrifice-don or 
offrande in the Essai sur la Nature et la Fonction du Sacrifice.28 
The gift economy evidently embodied two imperatives, the 
imperative to give and to receive gifts (to refuse a gift signalled a wilful 
severance of the social tie and basically amounted to a declaration of 
war) and the imperative not to appropriate for oneself any gift thus 
given and received. The second imperative, the proscription of any 
appropriation of the gift for oneself, relates to the social solidarity and 
the religious dimensions of the gift economy. Something of the self was 
given to the other but this something always had to be preserved and 
returned, and vice versa. Thus, a network of close social ties formed, 
the force of which literally tied individuals to one another so that no one 
could claim a completely independent existence, severed from the 
existence of others. The goal of the gift was primarily the solicitation of 
____________________ 
27 Ibid., 94. 
28 Hubert & Mauss, Essai sur la Nature et la Fonction du Sacrifice, 203–
204. 
Johan van der Walt [Type text] [Type text] 
22 
 
friendly relations, not the transfer of economic value – “l’objet en est de 
produire un sentiment amical entre les deux personnes.”29 
But there was more to the giving of gifts than the feelings of 
friendship solicited between people. The giving of gifts between 
persons solicited and celebrated the very generosity of things and of 
nature itself – “les échanges de cadeaux entre les hommes  . . . 
incitent les esprits des morts, les dieux, les choses, les animaux, la 
nature, à être “généreux envers eux. L’échange de cadeaux produit 
l’abondance de richess.”30  
Exchanging gifts was thus also a way of evading bad spirits. “On 
écart ainsi les mauvais esprits [et] les mauvaises influences.”31 The 
circulation of gifts tied all individual members of a gift society to one 
another, to the gods and to their natural environment in very 
fundamental way. At issue was literally a mixing of the human spirit 
with the spirits of things – “on mêle les âmes dans les choses, on mêle 
les choses dans les âmes.”32 
In some communities, the circulation of gifts mutated into a 
destructive competition of giving. Thus developed the potlatch, an 
exceptional form of gift exchange in the course of which every donor 
sought to surpass the value of gifts received by giving ever more 
valuable gifts in return. Instead of merely confirming with every gift 
____________________ 
29 Mauss, Essai sur le Don, 102. 
30 Ibid., 92. 
31 Ibid., 97. 
32 Ibid., 103. 
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given in return that nothing had been covetously appropriated when the 
gift was received, instead of merely confirming the communality and 
community that resulted from participation in the circle of giving, the 
potlatch turned into an excessive gesture through which the donor 
showed that the material worth or value of the gift meant nothing to 
him; hence also the development of an extreme form of the potlatch in 
the course of which gifts were no longer received and returned, but 
ostentatiously incinerated, as if they were no longer received from and 
given to the gods through receiving them from and giving them to 
another person. In other words, the gifts given in the potlatch were 
given directly to the gods in a way that could hardly be distinguished 
from practices and rituals of sacrifice. In fact, according to Mauss, 
these extreme forms of potlatch constituted a complete conflation of 
gift and sacrifice and an erasure of all differences between them – 
“nous avons ici, purement et simplement, la confusion des deux 
principes du sacrifice et du don.”33 
We have now put enough of Mauss’ text on the table to point out its 
underlying complexity and ambiguity. On the one hand, we 
encountered at the outset of our engagement with the text, Mauss’ 
observation that the analysis of the contractual exchanges of gifts 
between humans constituted one whole side of the theory of sacrifice – 
“tout un coté de la théorie du Sacrifice.” This observation suggests 
clearly that the study of the gift is an integral part of the study of 
sacrifice. On the other hand, we have now also noticed his invocation 
of the “simple conflation” of gift and sacrifice that occurs in the irregular 
practice of the potlatch. The invocation of irregular or specific 
“conflations” of gift and sacrifice clearly suggests the generality or 
regularity of the distinction between gift and sacrifice, and the reality of 
this distinction. An irregular conflation is clearly only possible on the 
back of a regular distinction. And, this oblique, but evident, invocation 
of a regular distinction between gift and sacrifice clearly renders 
Mauss’ initial subsumption of the study of the gift under the study of 
____________________ 
33 Ibid., 146. 
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sacrifice highly unstable. On the one hand, Mauss simply subsumes 
the gift under sacrifice. On the other hand, he draws a clear distinction 
between them. 
The aim of this scrutiny of Mauss’ famous text is, however, not to 
point out a logical deficiency or banal contradiction in it. The aim, to the 
contrary, is to affirm this text as an accurate and perceptive 
engagement with an irreducibly complex and ambiguous phenomenon 
that manifests itself in terms of unstable distinctions between, and 
conflations of, gift and sacrifice. The upshot of our engagement with 
Mauss’ text is this: Archaic sacrificial rituals and archaic exchanges of 
gifts can and should neither be simply conflated with one another, nor 
completely distinguished from one another. Mauss seems to offer an 
ambiguous answer to the question that we articulated in response to 
Agamben’s observation that all facere is sacer facere. The Essai sur le 
don seems to suggest that giving, dare, can and cannot be 
distinguished from facere as sacer facere. However, should this 
reading of Mauss’ enigmatic text be cogent, it would seem to offer us at 
least a narrow margin for contemplating the thought that constitution-
making could be, at least partially, a matter of constitution-giving. How 
might one pursue this thought further? 
How might one sustain by argument the possibility of a precarious 
distinction between gift and sacrifice as far as the birth of constitutions 
is concerned? The next section will endeavour to address this question 
with reference to the political and constitutional theories of Carl 
Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and John Rawls. 
 
D. Schmitt, Kelsen, and Rawls 
An attempt to conceptualise constitution-making in terms of 
constitution-giving and indeed in terms of the giving of gifts should 
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surely be tempted to turn to Carl Schmitt, the constitutional theorist 
who is renowned for making the concept of the Verfassunggebende 
Gewalt – literally, “constitution-giving authority – the centre piece of his 
constitutional theory. Schmitt’s Verfassunggebende Gewalt, conceived 
as it is on Sieyès’ pouvoir constituant, nevertheless leads one straight 
into a dead end as regards the contemplation of constitution-giving that 
can at least partially be exempted from sacrificial constitution-making. 
Not only is Schmitt’s political-theological conception of law and politics 
sacrificial through and through. His thinking almost constitutes a 
caricature of the link between political-theological sovereignty and 
sacrifice that Nancy articulates in the passage quoted above.34 Two 
further features of Schmitt’s constitutional thinking render the 
contemplation of constitution-giving as the giving of a gift implausible. 
The first concerns the temporal structure of the pouvoir constituant; the 
second concerns the irreducible unity of the people on which Schmitt 
insists. 
The temporal structure of the pouvoir constituant from which 
Schmitt’s notion of Verfassunggebung issues, simply does not allow for 
acts of giving or exchanges of gifts. As already shown above,35 Schmitt 
describes the pouvoir constituant with reference to Sieyès and to 
Spinoza’s concept of the natura naturans as an eternal creative energy 
that endlessly expresses itself in new forms. The essential presence of 
this natura naturans, however, never gets interrupted by any of the 
new forms it takes. Schmitt’s constitutional theory is a metaphysics of 
____________________ 
34 For a further elaboration of this point, Johan van der Walt, “Vertical 
Sovereignty, Horizontal Constitutionalism, Subterranean Capitalism: A 
Case of Competing Retroactivities,” South African Journal on Human 
Rights 26, no.1 (2010): 118–119. 
35 See fn. 7, supra. 
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presence par excellence, as Hans Lindahl has pointed out well.36 And 
here lies the essentially un-giving status of the pouvoir constituant, for 
no gift is conceivable on the basis of uninterrupted presence. Gifts 
cannot be mere continuations of already present states of existence. 
They cannot be continuations of that which already is fully present. 
They must come from elsewhere; they must always contain an element 
of surprising discontinuity. We know this when, as parents of small 
children, we hide gifts before we furtively put them under Christmas 
trees or next to the bed of a sleeping child, treading ever so softly. It is 
the mystery of the gift, and not the value of the gift, that makes the gift 
a gift. No gift without interruption or rupture, as Emilios Christodoulidis 
might want to put it.37 But, there is no real rupture conceivable in 
Schmitt’s pouvoir constituant. 
 Nor is there the essential doubling of the people that is required to 
make the giving of a constitution by a people to a people possible. For 
Schmitt the political group is essentially one. Its constitution – its 
absolute constitution – consists in its existential unity and sameness.38 
____________________ 
36 See Hans Lindahl, “Collective Self-Legislation as an Actus Impurus: A 
response to Heidegger’s Critique of European Nihilism,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 41 (2008): 323–343. 
37 Emilios Christodoulidis, “Strategies of Rupture,” Law and Critique 20, 3 
(2009): 3–26. 
38 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 3: “Das Wort ‘Verfassung’ muß auf die 
Verfassung des Staates, d.h. der politische Einheit eines Volkes 
beschränkt werden.”; Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: 
Dunker & Humblot, 1996), 39: “[Die politische Gruppierung] ist deshalb 
immer die maßgebende mensliche Gruppierung, die politische Einheit 
infolge dessen immer, wenn sie überhaupt vorhanden ist, die maßgebende 
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It is Kelsen, Schmitt’s classic antagonist, who posited such a doubling 
as an essential condition of constitutionalism. Kelsen’s constitutional 
theory pivots on a majority-minority distinction and division. No 
constitutional democracy worthy of the name “majority democracy” is 
possible without this distinction and division, he claims. There is no 
such thing as a majority principle without a minority principle. The two 
principles condition one another logically, argued Kelsen with 
impeccable rigour. Without regard to minority guarantees, dominant 
social groupings may well assert their dominance, but they cannot 
claim to be democratic majorities.39 The significance of this point of 
departure in Kelsen’s theory of democracy for the thought pursued in 
this paper should be abundantly clear. Against the background of 
Kelsen’s thought, the enigmatic idea of a people giving themselves a 
constitution, as suggested by the symbolics of the Weimar constitution, 
becomes quite plausible. Against this background, the idea of a 
constitution passing from the hands of a majority to the hands of a 
minority, and vice versa, indeed becomes possible, at least in principle. 
Is it also feasible? A close look at John Rawls’ articulation of the liberal 
political ethos that underpins his concept of public reason offers 
remarkable insights in this regard. 
Rawls describes the emergence of a liberal political ethos in terms of 
the gradual transformation of an initial modus vivendi into a veritable 
overlapping consensus. A modus vivendi has no firm foundation, 
                                                                                                                     
Einheit und ‘souverän’ in dem Sinne, daß die Entscheidung über den 
maßgebenden Fall, auch wenn das der Ausnahmefall ist, 
begriffsnotwendig immer bei ihr stehen muß. Das Wort ‘Souveränität’ hat 
hier einen guten Sinn, ebenso wie das Wort ‘Einheit.’” 
39 Kelsen Vom Wesem und Wert der Demokratie, 53, 57, 58. Kelsen 
articulates here, in a nutshell, the co-originality of democracy and rights to 
which Habermas has paid extensive attention in Faktizität und Geltung, 
(Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1992), 112–135; 167–187. 
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claims Rawls. It commences with a precarious compromise. The more 
the partakers in this initial and initiating compromise abide by the terms 
of the compromise, the more they gain trust that the terms of the 
compromise will also be respected in future. In the course of this 
process, what usually begins with nothing more than a precarious 
liberal democratic compromise between individuals with profoundly 
different burdens of judgment (and conflicting comprehensive world 
views), turns into a stable overlapping consensus.40 Where might gift 
and sacrifice figure in this process? I have argued elsewhere that 
Rawls’ concept of public reason cannot be rid of all sacrificial 
elements.41 However, the transformation of a modus vivendi into an 
overlapping consensus, which his political theory describes, also 
allows for the contemplation of public reason as a gift. 
The role of the gift in Rawls’ conception of the emergence and 
consolidation of public reason becomes evident when one pays 
attention to the simple fact that someone always has to take the first 
initiative, without knowing whether the initiative will be reciprocated. 
Someone simply has to take a chance and run a risk. Rawls pays 
some attention to this critical moment that conditions the emergence of 
a possible modus vivendi, but one can enrich his endeavours in this 
regard significantly with recourse to an insight of the French 
____________________ 
40 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 490–496; John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 142, 154–164; John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 15–16, 19, 44–48. 
41 See Johan van der Walt, “Rawls and Derrida on the historicity of 
constitutional democracy and international justice,” Constellations 16, no.1 
(2009): 23–41. 
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philosopher, Jacques Derrida: Someone has to offer hospitality to the 
event, that is, to the uncertain and unpredictable occurrence of a new 
beginning.42 Someone simply has to give others the chance to respond 
to the initiative of founding a new constitution. And at the early stages 
of founding a constitution by simply giving it a chance, reciprocation, 
too, remains a matter of taking chances and running risks. Nothing 
warrants an assumption that the first initiative is not a Trojan horse. 
Nothing warrants an assumption that a first gesture of giving will be 
corroborated by a second. Only when reciprocation has been 
forthcoming for a considerable length of time do the chance and risk 
elements of early initiatives and reciprocations dissipate to make way 
for significant levels of mutual trust and stable expectation. Only then 
can one begin to confidently assume the existence of an overlapping 
consensus that ultimately warrants something like constitutional rights 
guarantees.  
The transformation of a modus vivendi into an overlapping 
consensus is never complete though, and the gift of constitutions 
ultimately retains a residue of irreducible risk-taking. As we have seen 
from Mauss’ analysis of the gift economies of archaic societies, stable 
expectations in long standing arrangements of giving and counter-
giving eventually attain a contractual quality that renders the distinction 
between the reciprocal giving of gifts and mere compliance with regular 
contractual duties unstable and questionable. It is for this reason that 
Derrida also argued cogently that there is no such thing as a pure gift 
within any economic circle of exchange.43 But the inverse of Derrida’s 
____________________ 
42 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 55–57. 
43 Derrida, Donner le Temps 1. La Fausse Monnaie, 18–19: “S’il y a don, le 
donné du don . . . ne doit pas revenir au donant . . . Il ne doit pas circuler, il 
ne doit pas s’echanger.” The mere recognition of the gift as gift within a 
system of representation or hermeneutic comprehension, without any 
actual or material counter-gift or even any gratitude at issue yet, already 
effects the initiation of a circle of exchange that destroys the gift. “Il suffit 
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insight also applies. If there is no such thing as a pure gift, there is also 
no such thing as a purely reciprocal transaction. The possibility and 
likelihood of coercive enforcement does not eradicate the significant 
extent to which contractual transactions turn on taking a chance with 
the ultimate willingness and ability of the other party to comply with the 
agreed terms. It is not for no reason that risk management is a central 
concern of contemporary capitalism. Following up on Derrrida’s acute 
percipience regarding the impossibility of the pure gift, one can and 
must therefore add: There is also no such thing as a purely contractual 
transaction. It may not be accompanied by the spirit or intention of 
giving, but there is an irreducible element of giving at the very heart of 
every contractual exchange, provided of course, that none of the 
parties command the power to eliminate the element of risk completely. 
Mauss himself points out that the early Romans still discerned the 
root dare (to give), in vendere (to sell). It was only later that a dis-
embedded contract of emptio-venditio seemed to have extracted itself 
decisively from the consciousness that conditioned the economy of the 
gift. We learn in first year Roman law about the essential formula of the 
Roman contract: do ut des – I give so that you will give. We can infer 
from all of this that stable commercial contractual terms still turn 
fundamentally on elements of giving. This is not less so, but probably 
more so in the case of the emergence of social contracts that Rawls 
describes in terms of the transformation of a modus vivendi into an 
overlapping consensus. As long as a social contract lasts or prevails, 
the element of giving, which conditioned its emergence as a modus 
vivendi and sustained its transformation into an overlapping 
                                                                                                                     
donc que l’autre perceive le don . . .  pour que cette simple 
reconnaissance du don comme don, comme tel, avant même de devenir 
reconnaissance comme gratitude, annule le don comme don.” 
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consensus, never ceases to play a crucial role when the latter attains 
some consolidation. The risks to which the emergence of a modus 
vivendi and its transformation into an overlapping consensus respond 
remain real and irreducible. Here too, and even more so, the giving of 
the gift never culminates in the transfer of coined or coinable value that 
can be secured and extracted from social exchanges fraught with 
significant risk. This also applies to the liberal or constitutional 
democracy that Rawls has in mind. Its fundamental agreements and 
guarantees remain precarious. 
The liberal democratic social contract that Rawls describes thus 
never exists or culminates in the form of secured value that can be 
consolidated and cashed. What is it then that is given when we talk of 
the gift that brings about this contract? The irreducible element of 
giving in the gift economy that sustains the social contract ultimately 
turns on the degree of risk that is taken each and every time that the 
gift economy is renewed with a counter gift. What is given by taking a 
risk? What is given by taking a risk, moreover, with no hope of finally or 
ever extracting any secure gain from this risk? Here too, Rawls’ 
thinking may be enriched with another of Derrida’s acute observations 
regarding the gift: The moment of pure giving might be located in the 
chance and the time that is given to the other to reciprocate. Giving is 
not a matter of giving value. If giving were at all possible, it would be a 
matter of giving time – “ [c]e qu’il y a à donner, uniquement, 
s’appellerait le temps.”44 
It is instructive to relate this essential element of the gift, the giving of 
time, to another element of the gift economy that Mauss’ analysis 
brings to the fore: The giving of gifts involves more than an exchange 
between people. The giving of gifts solicits the abundance of things. It 
solicits benevolent spirits, the generosity of the gods and of nature 
itself. If the gift is ultimately not about the giving of value, but the giving 
of time, giving itself is nothing less than a solicitation of time. Giving 
____________________ 
44 Derrida, Donner le Temps, 45. 
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concerns a prayer, a prayer that time will give itself to us again so that 
we may live on. Gifts between humans constitute the way time gives 
itself to them. If time might still be gracious to them, if time might still 
allow humanity more time, it will turn on the extent to which humans 
might maintain economies of the gift. And the specific question that we 
are pursuing in this essay is whether Europeans may one day arrive at 
humanity of the gift. 
The thinking of this thought requires no mysticism or mythology. It 
turns on pure and sober phenomenology – sachliche Phenomenologie 
– one might say with allusion to Husserl’s understanding of 
phenomenology as a return to the thing itself, zurück zur Sache selbst. 
At issue in this sober phenomenology is the engagement with the initial 
opening of time to which Heidegger referred as the Ereignis.45 
Merleau-Ponty invoked in this regard the notion of the chiasme from 
which emerges the very distinction between the visible and invisible.46 
Hannah Arendt, in the rare moments that she stripped her own thinking 
of the new political myth that she pasted to the back of sound 
phenomenological intuitions, made mention of the hiatus that succeeds 
and precedes time and demands the forgiveness and promise that 
might inaugurate new beginnings.47 Stripped of all the modern 
romanticisms and ancient paganisms to which Heidegger’s thinking 
often succumbed, the essence of his penetrating contemplation of 
Dasein can be understood as the question concerning the way human 
existence might solicit time so that time would give itself to human 
____________________ 
45 Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, 14–25. 
46 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’ Invisible, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1964). 
47 Arendt, On Revolution, 205. 
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existence. This is the essential hermeneutic circle that the 
contemplation of Dasein extracted from Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.48 Again, stripped of the romantic and pagan excesses 
that Heidegger pasted on the back of his profound analyses of the 
hermeneutic cycle between time and the solicitation of time, 
phenomenology would return to its early sobriety and eventually 
____________________ 
48 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Tuሷbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1979), 372–437, especially the closing paragraphs on 436–437. It is 
important to distinguish this hermeneutic circle from the one that is current 
or currency in the tradition of semantic hermeneutics, say in the texts of 
Schleiermacher and Gadamer. The latter always, be it Schleiermacher’s 
concern with the circular relationship between the comprehension of part 
of the text and understanding the text as a whole, be it Gadamer’s concern 
with the circular relationship between pre-understanding (embodied in 
presuppositions) and understanding, concern circles of understanding 
within time. See again note 4 above. The insistence that the hermeneutic 
situation is universal (that is, it cannot be incircumvented) and irreducibly 
textual renders hermeneutics innerzeitlich, in time, and therefore in a 
significant aspect non-temporal and timelessly present (as long as it lasts). 
It is only when this textual or non-temporal hermeneutic circle is displaced, 
ruptured or interrupted by a different circular relation, namely the 
circulation between time and the solicitation of time, that hermeneutics 
become truly temporal. One should probably not even talk about a circle 
any more in the case of the latter, but only about that which, irreducibly 
related to the circle, always exceeds the circle. Derrida is again very 
precise and instructive in this regard. The hermeneutics that might engage 
with (the irreducibly non-economic) gift of time would not be strange to the 
circle or non-circular, but attentive to something strange to the circle. See 
Derrida, Donner le Temps 19: “Si la figure du cercle est essentielle à 
l’économique, le don doit rester anéconomique. Non qu’il demeure 
étranger au cercle, mail il doit garder au cercle un rapport d’étrangeté, un 
rapport sans rapport de familière étrangeté.” 
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become deconstruction: the solicitation of a primordial arché-difference 
or différance that might afford human existence significant alternatives 
(differences) and postponements (deferrals), none of which can be 
cashed in, but all of which may, or may not, afford more time.49 This, 
then, is the crucial question that phenomenology, the tradition of 
thinking that Europe has given the world, must ask at the time when 
Europe appears hell bent on sanitizing economies and cashing in 
current gains and current values by sacrificial externalisations of costs, 
as will become clear in a moment. At issue, in this cashing in, cashing 
up, or sanitisation, is an attempt to buy something out of time. 
Husserl’s Krisis der Europaïschen Wissenschaften has morphed yet 
again into a Krisis der Europaischen Wirtschaften, a crisis of the 
European economies.50 Both crises – perhaps it is ultimately just one 
and the same old crisis – pivot on oblivion regarding the way time 
constantly requires careful solicitation. 
When one looks beyond or beneath its anthropological curiosities, 
Mauss’ Essai sur le don may well be understood as a study in how 
archaic communities carefully cultivated and sustained a 
transcendental consciousness of time and a consciousness of time 
itself as a transcendental condition. In other words, the Essai sur le 
don may be understood as a study of the cultivation of a hermeneutic 
or phenomenological circle in the cycles of which a transcendental 
____________________ 
49 Jacques Derrida, Marges de la Philosophie (Paris: Les Éditions de 
Minuit, 1972), 8–19. 
50 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
transzendentale Phänomenologie in Gesammelte Schriften 8, (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992); Zur Phänomenologie des inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). 
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consciousness of time conditioned time as a transcendental condition 
of existence. At issue in this hermeneutic circle is a simple doubling of 
the genitive of in the expression consciousness of time. Read as a 
subjective and objective genitive, consciousness of time is also time’s 
consciousness. The Essai sur le don can be understood as an inquiry 
into the way archaic communities comprehended that existence in time 
but oblivious to time – existence absorbed by the presence of things 
and by its own presence – lose time in a very fundamental sense. They 
do not just lose a certain length of time. They do not just run out of the 
time calculated for purposes of doing this or that. They lose time itself 
and thus become lost in present pockets of time that have no temporal 
bearing or horizon, present pockets of time that are surely destined to 
run out of time.51 
 Within these dark pockets of time, the only consciousness that 
remains possible is a mindless incrementalism, invariably 
accompanied by claims of authoritative expertise, that scurry from one 
exasperating moment to the next. Ein kopfloser Inkrementalismus, 
Jürgen Habermas calls it in a passage to which we shall turn soon. 
And if the inner darkness of pockets does not appear to be an apt 
adjective for the glistening brilliance in which postmodern corporate 
capitalism is clad, one might even better invoke here a crystalline 
bubble of time that has come to envelope the best knowledge available 
in confounding halls of mirrors. 
The economic crisis of our time is evidently a crisis of knowledge 
and of science that is lost in a timeless bubble of blinding presence. It 
____________________ 
51 Heidegger called this situation of being lost in time or in pockets of time 
as an Innerzeitigkeit that obscures temporality. See Heidegger, Sein und 
Zeit, 404–428. That this existence lost in time is always also marked by a 
loss of time is clearly reflected in his observation that das man, the human 
individual who is lost in time, always experiences a lack of time. See ibid, 
410. 
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is in response to a similar scientific blindness that Husserl expressly re-
articulated transcendental phenomenology, in 1937, in terms of an 
inquiry into time consciousness that ultimately exposed the notion of an 
isolated present moment and thus of present knowledge or knowledge 
of presence as a misguided scientism that is highly unlikely, on its own, 
to produce any significant knowledge. Derrida’s later critiques of 
Husserl turned, in many respects, on insights that Husserl had already 
articulated. The undeniable elements of forceful critique evident in 
Derrida’s engagement with Husserl were aimed at the way Husserl 
regularly resisted his own insights into temporality.52 And the ingenuity 
evident in this critique consisted in restating Husserl’s insights 
forcefully in a world that showed all the signs, after an interim of 
disastrous implosion, of again settling into confounding seamless 
presences, of again settling into a world or worlds that lost track or 
trace of the way it always derives from and remains conditioned by 
precarious transcendental openings of time, openings of time that 
Derrida constructively called arché-writing or différance for lack of 
language that could name these pre-ceding and succeeding openings 
of time without reducing them to moments in time, that is, to moments 
of presence, be they past, present, or future moments of presence.53 
The importance of revisiting here these crucial developments in 20th 
century European philosophy, and the need to rethink them much more 
incisively, precisely, and extensively than can ultimately be done here, 
concern the way the mindless technocratic incrementalism in the grips 
of which Europe bungles on from one exasperating moment to the next 
____________________ 
52 Jacques Derrida, La Voix et le Phénomène, (Paris: PUF/Quadrige, 
1998); Jacques Derrida, Introduction à “l’Origine de la Géométrie” de 
Husserl, (Paris: PUF, 1962). 
53 See Derrida, Marges de la Philosophie, 21–22. 
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feeds from a stagnant hermeneutic bubble, the limits of which are no 
longer available for scrutiny and no longer co-conditioned by timely 
political interventions (or untimely political interventions, should one be 
comprehending these interventions from within time54). Recognition of 
the importance of re-engaging with these phenomenological insights 
regarding the temporality and historicity of human existence may also 
benefit well from a re-appraisal of Miachiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, for 
already here, we shall see below, does one find a significant treatise 
on politics as a virtuous solicitation of time that exceeds technocratic 
reactions to technical crises. Technocratic reactions always commence 
from within time (innerzeitlich) and proceed, incrementally, from one 
moment in time to the next. If at all worthy of being considered as a 
response to time, technocracy is a very late response, and invariably a 
response that comes too late. Technocracy is a response to a time that 
has already become fully manifest and it does not see beyond this 
manifest time. 
How might the generosity of humans solicit the gift of time itself? 
How might humanity suspend its consciousness of things that have 
become manifest within the parameters of an already disclosed period 
of time, so as to respond to time itself and the very disclosure of a time 
or an epoch? This is how Husserl’s question regarding the 
transcendental reduction or epoche, the suspension of every day 
consciousness so as to focus on the primary way in which things first 
become apparent to consciousness, might be recast today.55 And this 
____________________ 
54 When time is comprehended as a sequence of moments, the event that 
gives time (a time, another time, a significantly different time or epoch) will 
always come across as unexpected and untimely. But, it is in the untimely 
event that time discloses itself as truly timely, truly temporal, truly epochal. 
55 For Husserl’s expositions of the transcendental and eidetic reductions, 
See Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und 
phänomenologischen Philosophie in Gesammelte Schriften 5 (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner, 1992), 6, 16; Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen 
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is the underlying question that Mauss’ Essai sur le don can be seen to 
ask when one looks underneath its anthropological curiosities. It is the 
question of how human generosity might come to beget the generosity 
of time. How can generosity be begotten if generosity is required for 
this begetting? This is the ancient question of the impossibility of 
beginnings and the old question of the impossibility of constitutional 
beginnings, all over again. This question is asked here, urgently, 
against the background of Europe’s epochal inability to invoke, either 
Luxembourg 1841 style, a vertical doubling and external source of 
grace and generosity, or Weimar 1919 style, a horizontal doubling and 
lateral source of mutual generosity that goes by the name of self-
reflecting solidarity. Phenomenology teaches us that the latter, 
horizontal generosity, exceeds the immediacy of a second order 
                                                                                                                     
in Gesammelte Schriften 8 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992), §§ 34–35; 
Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1962), 281–285; Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen 
zur Genealogie der Logik (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1972), 94 ff. See also 
the discussions of the phenomenological reductions in Frederick Elliston 
and Peter McCormick (eds), Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre 
Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978); Marvin Farber, The 
Foundation of Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1943); Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Karl Schuhmann, Die 
Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1971); Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974). Again, the recasting of Husserl’s 
transcendental reduction or epoche above is based on a reading of 
Husserl’s texts and of these discussions of his work, but evidently does not 
intend to toe a strict exegetic line. 
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instrumental and technocratic manipulation of present realities and 
present crises. It exceeds this immediateness by maintaining a first 
order regard for the way solidarity itself requires careful solicitation and 
sustenance. It turns on a doubling of registers in which a temporal 
register of meticulous caring for time itself precedes and supersedes 
the a-temporal register of instrumental knowledge and technocratic 
manipulation of present realities. The vertical grace invoked in political 
theologies and political-theological constitutional foundations may well 
have fallen into irreparable obsolescence precisely because of the way 
this grace came to be assumed as an eternal presence and an eternal 
guarantee for technological mastery that requires no foundational 
solicitation, care, and sustenance. It is with regard to this metaphysical 
assumption that Kelsen and Rawls evidently part company with 
Schmitt. Rawls tells us that fundamental hermeneutic arrangements 
and normative frameworks commence with precarious modus 
vivendae. Kelsen teaches us that they never attain securely posited or 
positive present realties. They can at best be presupposed, and must 
be presupposed again and again. Thus do Kelsen and Rawls tend to 
the task of caring for the temporal horizons of basic hermeneutic and 
normative frameworks.  
 
E. Europe Between Gift and Sacrifice 
Stable constitutional principles emerge from the process in which an 
initial modus vivendi transforms into a reliable overlapping consensus, 
Rawls tells us. But who will take the initiative towards the compromise 
from which might ensue the first frail features of a common 
compromise? Who will be hospitable to the deeply fraught event or 
advent of a possible modus vivendi? The initiative will always be taken 
against the background of deep division and conflict. The one who 
takes the initiative takes an immense risk on many fronts. A political 
leader who ventures the first reconciliatory gesture towards enemies or 
political opponents not only risks rejection or abuse of this gesture by 
the enemy or opponent; she also risks losing her constituency. The first 
gesture is the first gesture exactly because everyone else is still 
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resisting it. Someone must take the crucial first step in the hope and 
faith that it may precipitate broader benevolence that is, as yet, non-
existent. Someone must solicit friendly or generous spirits, one might 
say with allusion to Mauss’ Essai sur le don. The remarkable and 
exceptional for-giving (prior-giving) initiative that first just Nelson 
Mandela, still in prison, and later a broader African National Congress 
leadership played in the South African constitution-giving process will 
remain, as long as time remains, the gift that South Africa will have 
bestowed to the world’s understanding of the primordial origins of new 
constitutions.56 
Timeo Danais dona ferre. Might the fear of bringing gifts to Greeks 
be the malevolent spirit in which the dream of the European 
Community currently appears to go up in smoke? Was this dream all 
along a sacrificial spirit that was bound to go up in smoke and fall to 
ash again, as has all too often literally been the case in Europe’s 
history? Is this why leading European states appear content to sacrifice 
Greece and Greeks by means of inhuman “saving packages” that save 
recklessly parasitic financial institutions instead of Greeks? Nancy’s 
perceptive linkage of sacrifice and political theology in the passage 
quoted above remains crucial for any incisive understanding of 
contemporary European politics. The sacrificial political theology of the 
northern European insistence that Greece and other faltering 
economies of Europe be subjected to paralysing austerity demands 
has been well recognised at the time by probing journalism. Le Monde 
Diplomatique published an illuminating Weberian analysis of northern 
____________________ 
56 For further elaboration of this point, see Van der Walt, “Vertical 
Sovereignty,” 102–129. 
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Europe’s response to the faltering Greek economy.57 Northern Europe, 
at least in comparison to southern Europe and Greece in particular, 
has been exemplary as far as their protestant work and savings ethics 
are concerned. Their economies, therefore, deserve the relative health 
that they are still enjoying. Southern Europe has not, and the time has 
come that they own up to and suffer for their lack of industriousness 
and thrift. Only thus might they receive expiation and hopefully come to 
mend their worldly ways. These are the key terms of Europe’s latest 
political theology. 
One can imagine the ridicule that will meet any suggestion that 
northern Europe might turn away from this economy of sacrifice to an 
economy of the gift. One can even imagine someone throwing the 
Derridean insight into the impossibility of the gift right into the face of 
this suggestion. There is no such thing as a gift that is not embedded in 
a reciprocal transactional scheme, the objection will assert. And what 
can one expect the Greeks to offer in return for any gifts that one may 
bestow on them now. This would be a perverted Derridean line, 
though, as we have already pointed out: True, there is no such thing as 
a pure gift, but neither is there something like a pure transaction. And if 
northern Europe might ever become as marginally magnanimous as to 
begin to think this thought, it might just become interested in taking a 
closer look at some of its past exchanges with Greece. One need not 
consider here the trans-epochal side of the spectrum, the Greek 
marbles in the British and Pergamon museums, the latter a couple of 
stone throws away from the Kanzlerampt in Berlin. One would surely 
not want to affirm the reciprocity of these exchanges, would one? 
The question whether the legacies of Kant and Hegel would have 
been thinkable without the antecedent legacies of Plato and Aristotle, 
whether the geniuses of Goethe and Schiller can be contemplated 
without Sophocles and Aeschylos, should not detain us, for no book-
____________________ 
57 Mona Chollet, “Aux sources morales de l’austerite,” Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March 2012, 3. 
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keeping is conceivable when the gifts of the gifted are exchanged with 
the unfathomable abundance and inoperative abandon that mark these 
exchanges. Inoperative abandon. Nancy contemplates, in contrast to 
the sacrificial and operative community, a literary, inoperative, and 
non-sacrificial community. Does Europe’s cultural wealth derive from 
the way its literary communities know and have always known how to 
partake without taking, to contribute without ever appropriating or 
owning anything? We have seen from the Essai sur le don that the 
ancients created wealth by giving and circulating wealth and by 
proscribing any appropriation of wealth. Thus did they solicit 
benevolent spirits and a generous abundance of things. What mattered 
to them was to be in touch with wealth, not to own it. Such is the 
literary community’s relation to literary wealth. That is why Umberto 
Eco can observe that Europe at least shares a culture if it shares 
nothing else.58 And by refusing to share anything else, Europe is surely 
moving to the verge of scandalously and shamefully betraying and 
destroying the spiritual ancestry that it does share.59  
Are Europe and the world as financially bankrupt as they 
increasingly appear to be because of the opposite logic at work in 
____________________ 
58 Gianni Riotta, “Nur die Kultur verbindet Europa,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
26 January 2012, 24. 
59 See in this regard Gunther Grass’ stinging lament “Europas Schande,” 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 May 2012, 15. To quote here just four lines: ‘Dir 
trotzend trägt Antigone Schwarz und landesweit/ kleidet Trauer das Volk, 
dessen Gast Du gewesen/. . . Geistlos verkümmern wirst Du ohne das 
Land,/dessen Geist dich, Europa, erdachte’. See also the discerning 
response to Grass by Ulrich Greiner, “Die Antike in Ehren,” Die Zeit, 31 
May 2012, 1. 
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financial speculation and market exchanges? For here, wealth is only 
ever circulated – invested – when certainty or high likelihood of 
extraction and appropriation prevails. Speculative capitalism has not 
only lost the ties it may once have had with gift exchanges, it has 
become the bizarre inverse or opposite of gift economies. When one 
creates toxic debts, sells them before they go putrid on your own 
books, and then pull out of the circulatory transfers before they find 
their way back to you, one does not give in order to give time. One 
“gives” in order to buy time for an exit. One counterfeits, trades in for 
real value, and gets the hell out of town before the hoax has time to get 
back to you. This is what happens whenever someone pulls out of a 
circle of speculative debt creation. It is, in fact, the whole point of 
entering the speculative circle. And this pulling out is exactly what the 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s of this world facilitate under guise of 
neutral monitoring. The active and performative role that credit rating 
agencies play in pulling the plug on circulatory speculation, always at 
the right time for some and at the wrong time for others, received far 
too little attention in attempts at understanding the global financial 
meltdown in recent years.60 But we are digressing. The Greek tragedy 
of our time concerns the termination of another circulatory exchange. 
Specifically at issue in the current tragedy of Greece is the structural 
dynamics of European export and import markets that resulted from 
the creation of the Euro. An interview with the Cologne political theorist 
Fritz Scharpf recently published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung under the 
____________________ 
60 See the damning observations regarding the role of the credit rating 
agencies in the genesis of the subprime crisis in the reports of Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate, 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2, 
243–317 and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of the United States, 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf, xxv. I am 
indebted for these references to an excellent assignment on Mauss and 
the financial crisis (submitted in the course Sociology/Anthropology of Law, 
University of Luxembourg, 2012) by M. Kriening. 
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provocative title Noch verteidigt Deutschland jeden Meter Boden, 
provides a clear analysis of these dynamics.61 The unification of the 
weak and strong European currencies of respectively manufacturing 
and exporting Member States, on the one hand, and non-
manufacturing and importing Member States, on the other, in one 
single European currency, was bound to have disastrous 
consequences for the latter. The weakening of the German currency 
and the strengthening of the Greek currency that resulted from 
replacing both the Mark and the Drachma with the Euro literally created 
export subsidies for the German and import tariffs for the Greek 
economy. The only way that Greece and other non-manufacturing 
Member States could play the importing role that the single currency 
designed for it, was to obtain money that its own economy stood no 
chance of producing, hence the debt or recession trap or combination 
of both that became Greece’s fatal destiny. This was one of the major 
design faults of the Euro that benefited especially the German and 
disrupted especially the Greek economy in recent years. This was, 
hopefully, not intended and there is little point in excessively lamenting 
what may well have been little more than technocratic oversight or a 
neo-liberal blind spot. Deeply lamentable, however, was and is the 
predominant response of those who benefitted for years from this 
design fault when the fault lines started to crack up. No one in her right 
____________________ 
61 Fritz Scharpf, “Noch verteidigt Deutschland jeden Meter Boden,” 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 December 2011, 12. A later observation by 
Habermas captures much of Scharpf’s argument in a nutshell: “In one and 
the same currency area, the export surplus and low unit labour costs of the 
one country are systematically interconnected with the import surplus and 
high unit labour costs of the other.” See Jürgen Habermas “Bringing the 
Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States,” European 
Law Journal 18, no. 4 (2012): 487. 
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mind would suggest that the Greeks are completely blameless as far 
as governmental failure is concerned. But all of a sudden they became 
scapegoats paying with nothing less than lifeblood for a miasmic 
spread of ambiguous pollution that was surely not a unilateral sin. 
Arbitrary expiatory coercion akin to that which René Girard discerned 
in archaic sacrificial rituals is written all over Europe today.62 
Will Europe commence with a gift or sacrifice? Will the constitution 
that Europeans might one day have given themselves pivot on an 
exchange of gifts or the imposition of sacrifices? Probably both. We 
have seen from our reading of Mauss’ text that gift and sacrifice are 
inextricably entwined. But, we have also seen from this reading that 
Mauss nevertheless continues to maintain a precarious distinction 
between gift and sacrifice. This precarious and unstable distinction 
may well be the key to any constitution that Europeans may one day 
have come to give themselves. For now Europe appears stuck in the 
logic of sacrifice that allows no distinct or distinguishable consideration 
for the economy of the gift. And this sacrificial logic is currently 
manifest as an apparently insurmountable impasse in European 
politics. This impasse has been pointed out masterfully by both 
Germany’s leading social theorist, Jürgen Habermas, and the Dutch 
journalist, Geert Mak. As Mak puts it, Europe is as paralysed with fear 
as De Hond van Tisma that got stuck in the Danube on a block of 
drifting ice. Tisma called the dog repeatedly but it remained as if frozen 
on the block of ice, drifting downstream. Someone needed to grab it by 
the collar to save it. “Uiteindelik wist een van de kinderen hem bij zijn 
nekvel te pakken, en alles liep goed af.”63 Habermas observes 
similarly: 
____________________ 
62 Rene Girard, La Violence et le Sacré (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 
1972). 
63 Geert Mak, De hond van Tisma. Wat als Europa klapt (Amsterdam: 
Atlas/Contact, 2012), 5. 
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The German Government has come to accelerate the destruction of 
solidarity across Europe, because it has for too long closed its eyes for 
the only constructive solution.  . . . All governments involved have thus 
far lacked courage [to act]. They fidget around helplessly in the catch–
22 between demands of big banks and rating agencies, on the one 
hand, and the fear of losing legitimacy in the eyes of their 
constituencies, on the other. Their mindless incrementalism [kopflose 
Inkrementalismus] betrays their lack of any further-reaching 
perspective.64  
The opening lines of this essay already mentioned Neil Walker’s 
probing inquiry into the question whether the Convention on the Future 
of Europe (2000–2003) could be understood in terms of a constitutional 
moment. Walker’s essay pays special attention to the community-
mobilizing force that Bruce Ackerman associated with constitutional 
moments.65 Much talk of such a community mobilizing moment indeed 
went around at the time of the Convention, observed the essay.66 
During a recent workshop in Luxembourg, Walker observed that this 
aspirational spirit has largely fallen silent in the years that followed.67 
Since the emergence of the financial crisis, it has basically fallen into 
complete oblivion. Whatever space it may have occupied for a while is 
now fully occupied by the unilateralism of bureaucratic elites that 
____________________ 
64 Translated from Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas. Ein Essay, 41. 
65 Walker, “The Legacy of Europe’s Constitutional Moment,” 384–388. 
66 Ibid., 398. 
67 Workshop ‘On the Way to a European Constitution?’ University of 
Luxembourg, 3–4 May 2012. 
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Habermas has come to call executive federalism 
(Exekutivföderalismus).68 In his response to the Greek elections on 6 
May and the political crisis that it precipitated, the then President of the 
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barosso, appeared determined to 
caricaturise the European Union’s lack of community and communal 
spirit by describing the European Union as a club, membership in  
which is conditioned by adherence to the rules. When one does not 
play by the rules, one has to leave the club, Barosso said.69 A deeper 
reflection on why a country, which has over millennia been an integral 
and definitive part of the historical and cultural reality that came to call 
itself Europe, is no longer capable of playing by the rules, of a little 
over fifty year old club, was evidently not one of Barosso’s concerns. In 
the aftermath of the week of 7 to 14 May 2012, a general acceptance 
that Greece must leave the European monetary union threatened to 
settled in the minds of Europe’s political and financial elites. Given the 
way Europe’s incremental and technocratic efforts to save the Euro 
zone were nailed to a narrowly fixed mind-set, it will come as no 
surprise if they would eventually run out of time and simply pass into 
nothingness. Fixed mind-sets, like all things present, do not endure. 
Only non-present time, and the regard for time as non-present and 
infinitely broad, endures.  
 
F. Between Merkel and Mandela 
____________________ 
68 Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 48. 
69 See http://www.euronews.com/2012/05/13/european-central-bankers-mull-greek-euro-exit/. The 
Greek Prime Minister (at that time) later denied the rumour that he had 
asked Barosso to make the statement. See 
http://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/05/30/reuters-report-papadimos-asked-barroso-to-threaten-greece-
out-of-eurozone/; http://www.athensnews.gr/portal/8/55845. 
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Timeo Danais dona ferre. Is there a way out of the sacrificial protestant 
political-theological trepidation that fears bringing gifts to the Greeks? 
An incarcerated Nelson Mandela risked alienating his constituency 
when he retreated from the logic of sacrifice to commence discussions 
with a regime that had been oppressing that constituency brutally for 
generations on end and without any end yet in sight. Greece and the 
governments of Greece may well have made serious mistakes in the 
past, but they have not systematically oppressed anyone outside 
Greece since the time of Alexander the Great. They have a lot for 
which they need to forgive one another, but the mistakes for which they 
might need pardoning from non-Greeks, from fellow Europeans, cannot 
even remotely be compared to those to which Mandela responded with 
the epochal pardon (par-don) of our time. 
The one leader of Europe who has the sovereign stature to unite 
Europe, not by the blood sacrifice of fellow Europeans, but by an 
unprecedented gesture of European solidarity, is sadly held captive by 
the protestant political theology of her domestic constituency. Her eyes 
are on domestic electoral politics, not on Europe, as the celebrated 
Italian journalist Eugenio Scalfari observed in 2012.70 No one in the 
United States would contemplate dropping California from the Union 
because of its now almost endemic bankruptcy, the Harvard legal 
scholar Joe Singer told me some weeks ago. Germany is not 
____________________ 
70 Eugenio Scalfari, “Das wäre die vierte Schuld,” Die Zeit, 15 March 2012, 
7. Habermas, “Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the 
Integration of States,” 485–488, at 488, observes similarly in a cutting 
fashion: “Time and again, the party leader Angela Merkel seems to 
admonish the chancellor Angela Merkel to put European integration on the 
back burner out of consideration for the reservations of her Eurosceptic 
voters.” 
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completely unfamiliar with this kind of solidarity. Saarland has been 
bankrupt and held on a federal financial lifeline for years on end now. 
And that federal lifeline has not been thrown to the Saarlandians on 
condition that thousands of them compete for food from garbage cans, 
as is the case with the saving packages currently imposed on Greece. 
Europeans will not give themselves a Constitution until such time as 
the solidarity between citizens within Member States is extended to 
citizens of other Member States.  
What will it take for this kind of solidarity to emerge? An inter-
European social solidarity will surely not emerge from a European 
jurisprudence that is perceived by too many Europeans to be bent on 
destroying whatever social solidarity structures still exist within Member 
States. That recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice is 
currently perceived to be doing exactly this is evident from an 
extensive list of academic publications that responded to the ECJ’s 
decisions in the Laval, Viking and Rüffert cases. 71 The insistence that 
informs most of these publications turns on the intuition that one 
cannot create solidarity by destroying solidarity. The intimations of 
potential constitutional self-protection that the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has articulated in a whole series of judgments 
should not surprise anyone against the background of European 
jurisprudential and political developments that potentially pose 
significant threats to national social democratic politics, and pose them, 
moreover, not for the sake of greater inter-European solidarity, but for 
the sake of a reckless free market ideology that shows no concern 
whatsoever for anything worthy of the name solidarity.72 Any 
____________________ 
71 Case C-341/05, Laval, (2007); Case C-438/05, Viking, (2007); Case C-
346/06, Rüffert, (2008). 
72 See BVerfG 37, 271 (Solange I); BVerfG 73, 339 (Solange II); BVerfG 
89, 155 (Maastricht); BVerfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Görgülü, 2004); BVerfG 
123, 267 (Lisbon, 2009); BVerfG, 2 BvR 987/10 (Rescue Packages, 2011). 
Whether the German Constitutional Court will or can really put its money 
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jurisprudence that might be perceived to promote social dumping and 
destroy domestic social securities in Europe is bound to elicit more and 
more antipathy as far as broader European social solidarity is 
concerned.73 If the German Chancellor might still come to entertain the 
idea of taking her constituency with her on the journey towards greater 
European solidarity, instead of herself remaining captive to their 
protestant trepidations, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Laval, 
Viking, and Rüffert cases is not the kind of thing that will make her task 
any easier.74 Perceptions of “social dumping” will not spread social 
democratic solidarity in Europe; it will only destroy what is left of it. 
                                                                                                                     
where its mouth is as another question. See Weiler’s brutal exposure of 
the emptiness of the Court’s rhetoric regarding the protection of German 
democratic sovereignty against erosion by the increasing powers of the 
European institutions in Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Does Europe Need a 
Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision,” 
European Law Journal 1, no. 3 (1995): 219–258. 
73 Even Mario Monti recognised this. See the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Enforcement of 
Directive 96/71/EC Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework 
of the Provision of Services, Brussels, 21 March 2012, 5: “Professor Monti 
. . .  recognised that the controversy fuelled by the rulings ‘has the 
potential to alienate from the Single Market and the EU a segment of 
public opinion,workers’ movements and trade unions, which has been over 
time a key supporter of economic integration’. He further added that ‘the 
Court’s cases have exposed the fault lines that run between the Single 
Market and the social dimension at national level.’” 
74 Catherine Barnard, “Employment Rights, Free Movement Under the EC 
Treaty and the Services Directive,” Europa Institute Mitchell Working 
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The suggestion here is not that these perceptions regarding the 
solidarity-destroying jurisprudence of the ECJ are “correct.” The 
jurisprudence that informed the ECJ’s judgments in the Laval, Viking, 
and Rüffert cases may well have been informed by a forceful argument 
that the overall effect of this line of jurisprudence does not destroy but 
promotes solidarity. Laval, Viking, and Rüffert can indeed be argued to 
open up the exclusive employment markets of the better-off workers in 
the EU’s stronger economies to less well-off workers in the EU’s 
weaker economies. Even Catherine Barnard, one of the most critical 
among scholars who are critical of Laval, Viking, and Rüffert, concedes 
this point.75 Her position will surely not convince those that firmly 
                                                                                                                     
Paper Series 5/2008, 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/44_employmentrightsfreemovementundertheectreatyandth
eservicesdirective.pdf; Catherine Barnard, “Social Dumping or Dumping 
Socialism? Case Note on Laval and Rüffert,” Cambridge Law Journal 67 
(2008): 262; Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, “Informal Politics, 
Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: 
Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval,” European 
Law Journal 15, no.1 (2009): 1ff.; Robert Rebhahn, “Grundrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten im Kollektiven Arbeitsrecht vor dem Hintergrund der neuen 
EuGH Rechtsprechung” referenced on this page, 
http://www.etui.org/fr/Themes/Dialogue-social-et-negociation-collective/Legislation-sociale/Interpretation-
de-la-Cour-europeenne-de-Justice/Reaction-aux-jugements/Articles-Presse-etc, but no longer 
accessible (Prof. Rebhahn kindly provided me with a copy on request); 
Rebhahn, “Grundfreiheit Vor Arbeitskampf,” Zesar (2008): 57–65; Fritz 
Scharpf, “The Only Solution is to Refuse to Comply with the ECJ Rulings” 
http://www.boeckler.de/164_92433.html. See also, poignantly, Emilios Christodoulidis, 
“A Default Constitutionalism? Some Cautionary Remarks on the Many 
Constitutions of Europe” in Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (eds), The Many 
Constitutions of Europe (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). 
75 Catherine Barnard, “A Proportionate Response to Proportionality,” 
European Law Review 37 (2012): 122–123. 
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believe that the destruction of social solidarity structures in stronger 
economies will only spread vulnerability. It will not improve the 
conditions of the vulnerable. But this is beside the point; the point is 
that a court of justice should not enter this kind of political 
disagreement. No one, and no court, can identify “the right answer” in 
cases such as these, where the key question concerns issues that are 
socially deeply divisive. The decisions in Laval, Viking, and Rüffert – if 
taken in the same way that they were taken in these cases – would 
have remained as problematic and socially divisive had they gone the 
other way.76 
____________________ 
76 I would like to argue that these decisions should have gone the other 
way, but it should have gone the other way on the basis of a completely 
different jurisprudence than the one the ECJ developed in these cases. I 
articulate this argument fully in Johan van der Walt, The Horizontality 
Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty (Berlin: Walther de Gruyter, 
2014), 334–360. The essence of the argument can nevertheless be 
captured in four crucial steps or points: 1) The balancing of broad legal 
principles (fundamental freedoms and rights) which has come to dominate 
contemporary judicial review in many jurisdictions of the world and also 
informed the judgment in Laval, Viking, and Rüffert should be reserved for 
the exceptional cases in which legislation or absence of legislation (tacitus 
consensu populi) applicable in the case gives rise to the destruction of the 
essence of a fundamental right or limits that fundamental right irrationally. 
2) These kind of balancing procedures should especially be avoided in the 
case of socially divisive issues. When existing legislation or absence of 
legislation that governs such socially divisive issues does not destroy the 
essence of a right or limit it irrationally, the court should not engage in any 
finer or further balancing procedures. 3) Such “finer” balancing procedures 
should be reserved for “purely” private law disputes where concerns of 
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“individual justice” and the need to “resolve” or at least terminate private 
disputes are at stake. They are acceptable and unproblematic as an 
integral part of private law adjudication in which recourse to general 
principles of private law have always played a crucial role. They have no 
role or place in disputes that raise divisive social convictions that can 
obviously neither be resolved nor terminated but ultimately only 
aggravated by judicial decisions. 4) Democratic politics and electoral 
processes provide the only means through which deeply divisive social 
issues can be legitimately laid to rest – at least for a while. Judiciaries 
cannot play a significant role in these processes apart from checking for 
the wholesale destruction or irrational limitations of rights, both of which 
(destruction of the essence and irrational limitation of a right), when 
positively identified, should be self-evident enough to render possible 
scope for significant social or political disputation negligible. When the 
disputes in Laval, Viking, and Rüffert are tested against these principles, it 
becomes evident that the court should not have entered the fray here by 
taking recourse to “balancing procedures.” These disputes all concerned 
deeply divisive social concerns that go to the heart of a class struggle that 
has been defining and dividing European societies for more than a 
century. No judiciary can or could have laid these disputes to rest by 
“balancing” the class interests involved. All that any judiciary can or could 
have achieved through such balancing is to earn for itself the reputation of 
being or having become partisans in the conflict, whichever way they end 
or ended up judging the matter. The Laval, Viking, and Rüffert judiciary 
should have deferred to legislation or absence of legislation as the will of 
the legislature. The issue was clear under the circumstances. There was 
no EU legislation that clearly governed these cases. That is why the Court 
resorted to balancing procedures. But instead of resorting to balancing 
procedures, the court should have taken the absence of EU legislation as 
an indication of the will of the EU legislator that Member State law still 
applies to these cases. 
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What might, then, come to spread instead of destroy social 
democratic solidarity in Europe? Ultimately, one does not and cannot 
know for sure. At issue here will be a new configuration of partial 
knowledge and utter ignorance that is not subject to prediction. Neither 
will it warrant predictions. No destiny is entirely in the hands of mortals. 
Both benevolent and malevolent spirits appear to be primordial realities 
that condition a time or an epoch in some way or another. Humanity 
has always had to contend with these realities and the disenchantment 
of the world brought about by the advent of modernity and the age of 
Enlightenment has not made us complete strangers to invocations of 
“the spirit of an age.” Nicolo Machiavelli, the pioneering theorist of 
modern politics, was surely incisively aware of the extent to which 
politics concern the art of managing humours.77 However, the modern 
disenchantment of the world, without which Machiavelli’s sublime 
political thought can also not be fully understood, has finally led to 
apparently insurmountable incredulity regarding the possibility of 
politics as a non-manipulative solicitation of a benevolent age and 
benevolent times.78 The banal technocratic strategies of the Prince 
have come to displace the awesome insights into promising 
conjunctions of fate and virtue articulated in The Discourses on Livy.79 
____________________ 
77 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 38–40. See also the explanatory note of Peter and Julia 
Bondanella at 364, note 38; and Anthony Parel, The Machiavellian 
Cosmos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
78 Alasdair Macintyre, A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1966), 
121–145; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) II, 18. 
79 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us (London/New York: Verso, 1955), 
17–19. 
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But the ancients, Mauss tells us in the Essai sur le don, were 
convinced that benevolent spirits could be solicited by an exchange of 
gifts. How might this wisdom return to us, non-manipulatively, in the 
wake of the disenchantment of the world precipitated by the advent of 
modernity and the age of Enlightenment? How might this wisdom 
return without re-invoking pre-Enlightenment mythologies? This is 
exactly what we do not and cannot know for sure. However, one can 
imagine that, should this wisdom have returned one day, it will have 
returned in the form and format of a first gesture of giving. On the 
shoulders of this gesture will rest the chance of the first significant 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative relations 
between Europeans.80 
The first gesture of giving, the first gift, will itself probably only 
become possible on the back of the insight that the first gift is neither a 
pure gift nor truly a first gift. At issue in this observation is again the 
extension of the Derridean regard for the impossibility of the pure gift, 
to a regard for the impossibility of a pure transaction. The first gift and 
first gesture of giving will be conditioned by a regard for margins of 
benefit, already received, that exceed the terms of strict reciprocal 
exchanges under which they may have been presented. Benefits 
previously received will not always be readily identifiable. Who or what 
implanted the gift of super-human generosity in the heart of Nelson 
Mandela will remain clouded in mystery, mystery of the kind that the 
ancients explained with reference to the generosity of the gods and to 
which some South Africans still refer as Ubuntu, the spirit of African 
humanism.81 But, one need not and should not indulge in obscure 
____________________ 
80 See Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility – On the Legitimation of 
Human Suffering (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 55; Alasdair 
Macintyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985), 26. 
81 Drucilla Cornell and Nyoko Muvangua (eds), uBuntu and the Law: 
African Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2011). 
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mythologies and neo-paganisms. Profound respect for the reality that 
an epoch or lifetime is conditioned by irreducible temporal horizons that 
cannot be named from within the boundaries or parameters of that 
epoch or lifetime is a minimal, but sufficient, condition for remaining 
alert to the circular hermeneutic or phenomenological task of soliciting 
and sustaining those horizons with meticulous care. The surest way of 
killing gods and rendering them ancient is to give them operative 
names that render them present.  
 
G. Unknown Origins, Inexplicable Grace  
Besides, benefits received previously are frequently not that difficult to 
discern. We learn from Fritz Sharpf that Northern Europe’s ungiving 
and unforgiving response to Greece’s current woes pivots on 
deliberate ignorance regarding the extent to which it has, since the 
construction of the Euro, benefitted from these very woes. We need not 
allude again to the gifts the ancient Danaians (dessen Geist Dich, 
Europa, erdachte82) bestowed on Europe. At issue is the short history 
of little more than a decade of single monetary currency in Europe from 
which Northern Europe gained and will gain far more than it can 
reasonably fear to lose, a short history of irreducibly entangled cross 
benefits and harms. Northern Europe is currently in the grips of an 
exacting sacrificial (purifying, sanitising) spirit that appears determined 
to establish who owns and deserves what in Europe. Only an 
unforgiving, ungiving, and vindictive spirit would contemplate such a 
pointless endeavour exactly at a time when an unquestioning solidarity 
appears to be the only constructive and productive way forward. One 
knows not whence might the grace come, assuming it might come still, 
____________________ 
82 See Grass, “Europas Schande,” supra. 
[Type text] [Type text] Johan van der Walt 
that will render Europe, perhaps for the first time since its Aegean 
beginnings, truly gracious.83 Again, such advents are not fully subject 
to knowledge and understanding. When they come, they always 
precede full comprehension. One always understands later, ex post 
facto, that something has or may have been given; hence also the 
future anterior employed throughout this essay: the constitution that 
Europeans may one day have given themselves. The gift economy, 
Mauss teaches us, requires initiation by a first absurd gesture of giving 
that exceeds knowledge and understanding, a gesture that exceeds 
and, therefore, precedes the capacity of the most advanced and 
sophisticated hermeneutics conceivable.  
There is a quaint story of a grandfather who took his grandson to 
view his strawberry patch. “Look,” he told the boy, “these rows over 
here I planted for us. These are our strawberries. And those two rows 
over there are for the birds. Those strawberries are theirs.” The boy 
responded with perplexed disbelief: “But, Grandpa, the birds won’t 
know, they will also eat our strawberries.” “That is quite all right,” the 
old man said, “then we also just eat some of theirs.” 
____________________ 
83 If Europe does not have a demos, it is more fundamentally due to the 
lack of political grace and graciousness (one can also just call it solidarity), 
than a lack of a common language, as Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe Need 
a Constitution?,” European Law Journal 1, no.3 (1995): 296, suggests. If 
everyone is well aware that every Member State is only in the Union to 
protect and promote their own interests, nothing more than the current 
(and centuries-old) mix of disastrous mutual suspicion, faltering 
instrumental cooperation and desperate technocratic tinkering can ever be 
expected. And the big question is who will have the political greatness or 
graciousness to break this circle of mutual suspicion, self-interest and 
mindless technocracy. 
